美国总统当选人特朗普前段时间与台湾地区领导人蔡英文进行了直接通话。虽然此次通话是特朗普接受各国领导人祝贺当选的一系列电话中的一部分，该新闻也加剧了外界对其外交政策应对能力的担忧。特朗普不听从政府专业人士建议的做法将带来巨大风险；此外，特朗普不仅对长久以来美国的国家安全问题知之甚少，并且对由于无知而采取行动所带来的潜在危害似乎也不以为意。
背景
自1979年美中两国正式建立外交关系以来，没有任何一届美国总统或总统当选人曾与时任台湾领导人会晤或通话。这是自美国承认中华人民共和国是代表中国的唯一合法政府、并承诺在非官方层面开展美台关系后，华盛顿与北京达成默契的对台方式之一。
多年以来，美国官员通过策略性的调整得以与台湾方面开展互动，从而维护和扩大了美国国家利益，并体现出对台湾及其民主政治恰如其分的尊重。虽然美国的最高领导层（包括总统和总统当选人）与台湾地区领导人之间有私下的书信往来，但双方都心知肚明：若是直接对话必将越过底线，而这条底线并不值得去挑战。
中国对台湾的主权主张长期以来一直是美中关系中最为敏感的话题。台湾问题是1972年尼克松总统访华前美中磋商进程中的首要障碍，围绕如何妥善处理台湾问题所展开的协商是由尼克松总统、卡特总统、国务卿基辛格、国务卿万斯和国家安全顾问布热津斯基等外交专家合力促成的，也是美中关系的奠基石 ——三个联合公报的核心。纵观美台关系的方方面面，无论是美国对台军售、高层会谈、军方接触、高官互访、台湾地区领导人过境美国，或美台双边协议，美国政府如何在遵守与台湾保持“非官方”关系这一承诺的前提下有所为而有所不为则是有长期的历史可借鉴的。美国政府不会在没有准备或反思的情况下突然改变对台关系框架的核心， 因为该框架一直以来维护了美国、台湾、以及美中关系中的各方利益。更重要的是，该框架长久地维护了地区安全。
与历史背道而驰
不幸的是，总统当选人特朗普在没有向熟悉美台长期事务的国务院资深官员咨询的情况下就强势介入了美台关系中最错综复杂的部分。中国政府对这通电话的解读很可能远超私人谈话， 并很可能认为此举动摇了美中关系建立的重要根本之一。中方向来对任何其视为美国对台政策上的潜在转变都反应激烈。回顾1995年，当美国史无前例地邀请时任台湾地区领导人访美并在康奈尔大学演讲后，中国政府随即进行了针对台湾的导弹发射及军事演习。中国政府的这一行为阐释了其思维模式。对此，无论美国喜欢或欣赏与否，都不应忽视。
目前，判断中国政府是否会过激采取损害美国或台湾的利益的行动还为时过早。希望中国政府能冷静考虑并克制处理，避免过早破坏同即将上任的特朗普政府之间的关系。然而，特朗普本也不应该借由这通电话对中国进行测试。由于民进党一贯的“台独”主张，自今年年初民进党候选人蔡英文当选后，中国与台湾现在正处于关系极度敏感期。由于蔡英文不承认“一个中国”原则，北京已经切断了与台湾的政治往来。尽管各方对“一个中国原则”有着不同的诠释，该原则却是中国大陆与台湾此前一切接触的基础。蔡英文出于政治考虑及党派信念不承认这一原则，而在其与特朗普通话前，台湾的不合作态度已经带来了风险——大陆可能会以破坏性的方式对台湾加强施压。这通事出无名的电话只会使风险加剧。
三边利益
美中台关系框架发生根本性改变并不符合台湾的利益，北京在台海问题上保持克制对于维护台湾安全至关重要。美国对台军售以及美国基于《与台湾关系法》（该法在1980年美国与台湾签订的安全条例作废后通过）所承诺给予对台湾的支持固然宝贵，但中国对于和平解决两岸问题的一贯主张也至少同等重要。对中国政府最为敏感的国家和安全问题采取蔑视的态度或许能换来暂时的满足感，但当中国政府有多种反制手段可用时激怒对方则于战略上无益。蔡英文希望与即将上任的美国总统建立联系并获得尊重的愿望可以理解；令人费解的是，即将上任的美国总统却随意地忽视掉了自尼克松以来的八任总统都能一致理解的历史和战略因素，并接受了此次通话请求。
许多共和党官员都熟知这一历史并曾亲历三边关系的管理。他们了解美国对华、对台关系的重要性，以及如何在重重挑战中为两段关系保驾护航。他们中的许多人当初曾公开反对作为候选人的特朗普，与其冰释前嫌可能还需假以时日。总统当选人特朗普如果能积极接触这一庞大的共和党人才储备，在过渡期听取其建议并从中寻求未来政府的合适人选；与此同时征询国务院和情报机关中具备多年外交问题处理经验官员们的专业建议，他还是可以在未来的决策中变得谨慎和明智。当然总统当选人特朗普完全可以漠视他们的建议，但这将与美国国家以及他本人的利益背道而驰。
The news that President-elect Trump has spoken by phone to Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen as part of the series of congratulatory calls on his election heightens concerns about Trump’s foreign policy deftness. There are serious risks posed by his failure to take briefings by government professionals, and he appears to have little respect for the potential damage of actions taken without understanding long-standing U.S. national security concerns.
The backstory
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, no U.S. president or president-elect has had a face-to-face or telephone conversation with his Taiwan counterpart. This was an implicit part of the arrangement Washington accepted when it recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of all of China and agreed to conduct its relations with Taiwan on an unofficial basis.
Over the years, there have been tactical adjustments to ensure that U.S. officials can interact with Taiwan counterparts to pursue and protect our interests and to show proper respect for Taiwan and its democracy. However, our top-level officials—particularly the president—have always shown great care not to upset the post-1979 arrangements. There have been quiet, non-visible written communications between the top leaders of the United States (including presidents and presidents-elect) and Taiwan, but it has always been understood that direct conversations would cross a line not worth challenging.
China’s claim to Taiwan is, and has long been, the most sensitive issue in U.S.-China relations. It was the principal obstacle to our getting together with Beijing before President Nixon’s 1972 trip, and negotiation of how to handle the issue—the handiwork of Presidents Nixon and Carter and Secretary Kissinger, Secretary Vance, and National Security Advisor Brzezinski—was the central feature of the three Joint Communiques laying the basis for our relationship. On every aspect of the U.S. relationship with Taiwan—whether it be U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, high-level meetings, military-to-military contacts, visits by senior officials, transits of the United States by Taiwan leaders, or bilateral U.S.-Taiwan agreements—there is a long history about what the United States can do consistent with its commitment to an “unofficial” relationship with Taiwan. The U.S. government does not suddenly, without preparation or reflection, change essential features in a framework that has served our interests, those of Taiwan, and those of the U.S.-China relationship. And most importantly, that has kept the peace in the region.
A break with the past
Unfortunately, President-elect Trump has waded into the thicket of U.S.-Taiwan relations without any apparent briefings by senior State Department officials intimately familiar with this long history. This phone call will likely to be interpreted by Beijing as something much more than a personal chat. The Chinese, unfortunately, are likely to see this as threatening a cornerstone of the edifice on which U.S.-China relations are built. The Chinese rarely overlook what they perceive a potential alteration in U.S. policy toward Taiwan. A look back at their conduct in 1995, when they undertook ballistic military exercises that threatened Taiwan in the wake of an unprecedented U.S. invitation to Taiwan’s president to speak at Cornell University, illustrates the Chinese mindset. We may neither like nor admire this, but we cannot ignore it.
It is too soon to tell if the Chinese will overreact by taking steps against either Taiwan or American interests. So far, it would appear that cooler heads will prevail in Beijing. They seem to be blaming Taiwan’s leadership, rather than publicly asserting that Trump or the United States was responsible. They may judge that they should show restraint in order to avoid rocking the boat too soon in their relationship with the incoming Trump administration. That is not an experiment, however, that Trump should have conducted. It will put Beijing more on edge to react harshly to future challenges by Trump . Additionally, relations between Beijing and Taipei are especially sensitive right now, since the election of the candidate of the historically pro-independence DPP party earlier this year. That prompted Beijing to cut off political ties with Taiwan until President Tsai recognizes the “one China principle” that, under various interpretations, underlies previous contacts. President Tsai cannot do that for reasons of politics and conviction, and before the Trump-Tsai conversation there was a risk that Beijing might increase pressure on a recalcitrant Taiwan in damaging ways. That risk can only be compounded by this gratuitous phone conversation.
The triangle of interests
It is not in Taiwan’s interest to see the framework of the U.S.-PRC-Taiwan relationship fundamentally altered. Restraint across the Taiwan Strait on the part of Beijing is essential for Taiwan’s security. Arms purchased from the United States and U.S. assurances of support under the Taiwan Relations Act passed after the lapse of the U.S.-Republic of China (Taiwan) security treaty in 1980 are valuable, but Chinese continued intention to resolve cross-Strait issues peacefully is at least as important. Thumbing our noses at Beijing on its most sensitive national and security issue may feel temporarily satisfying, but provoking it when it has many cards to play makes no strategic sense. One can empathize with President Tsai’s desire to establish contact with and gain respect from the incoming U.S. president. What is incomprehensible, however, is how the incoming U.S. president could casually ignore the historic and strategic factors that all eight presidents since Nixon have understood and acceded to the call.
There are many Republican officials who understand this history well and have been involved in managing it. They know the importance of the U.S. relationship with China, with Taiwan, and how we have protected both despite the sometimes contradictory challenges. A number of them declared their opposition to candidate Trump, and wounds may be slow in healing. President-elect Trump would be well-advised, however, to reach out to this large reservoir of talent, both for advice during the transition and to staff his administration, as well as to draw on the great expertise of State Department and intelligence community officials, who have years steeped in these problems. President-elect Trump is free to disregard their advice, but it is profoundly contrary to American, and his, interest to ignore it.
